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The key rights protected under EU law in the 
area of environment, energy and sustainability 
are the so-called “procedural environmental 
rights”: access to environmental information, 
public participation in environmental decision-
making, and access to justice in environmental 
matters. 
EU law on procedural environmental rights is 
heavily interlinked with two international treaties 
to which the UK is a party: the Aarhus Conven-
tion on the Access to Information, Public Partici-
pation and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters1 and the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (ECHR). The following sections 
identify the risks arising from Brexit in light of the 
interplay between EU law and these two treaties 
(1-2), and the benefits of procedural environ-
mental rights as protected under EU law (3).   
                                                        
1 Out of 49 State parties to the Aarhus Convention, 29 are 
EU Member States, and the EU itself is also a party. 
2 Directive 2003/4/EC; see also Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 and EU Charter Art. 42. 
3 Directive 2011/92/EU (codification) and Directive 
2010/75/EU. 
4 Directive 2001/42/EC. Note that this Directive was not 
amended in light of the Aarhus Convention, but already 
contained provisions on public participation. 
5 COM (2003) 624 final. 
1. Risks with regard to EU law 
vis-à-vis the Aarhus 
Convention 
To a great extent, EU law on procedural environ-
mental rights aims to implement the Aarhus 
Convention with regard to: 
• Access to environmental information 
(with provisions on access to justice);2  
• Public participation in environmental im-
pact assessments of public and private 
projects and in permitting processes re-
lation to industrial installations (with pro-
visions on access to justice); 3  and 
• Public participation in strategic environ-
mental assessment of plans and pro-
grammes.4  
The EU legislator, however, has been unable to 
contribute more significantly to the implementa-
tion of the Aarhus obligations related to access 
to justice (notably, in relation to judicial and ad-
ministrative review proceedings to challenge 
acts and omissions by public authorities that 
contravene environmental law). This is due to 
lack of progress on the Commission’s proposal 
for a directive implementing the relevant provi-
sions of the Aarhus Convention at the Member 
State level.5 Nevertheless, the EU judiciary has 
indicated that national regulations on access to 
justice in environmental matters need to be in-
terpreted so as to give full effect to the standards 
of the Convention and avoid making the exercise 
of the right impossible, or excessively difficult, in 
practice.6 In addition, the EU legislator has in-
serted provisions on public participation in envi-
ronmental decision-making in certain pieces of 
sectoral EU environmental law, albeit in an une-
ven manner.7 A much more detailed analysis will 
6 Case C-240/09 – Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, paras 46-
51. 
7 Compare public participation under Directive 2000/60/EC 
(“Water Framework Directive”) to narrow participation un-
der licensing scheme managed by EU bodies, e.g. GMO 
authorisation. M. Lee, ‘Experts and Publics in EU Environ-
mental Law’ in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of European Union Law (2015) 991, pp. 1008-9. 
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be required to determine if and to what extent 
different pieces of sectoral EU environmental 
law add to the implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention. 
While international obligations on environmental 
procedural rights are binding upon the UK as a 
party to the Aarhus Convention independently of 
EU law, the main risk arising from Brexit in this 
connection is losing the “hard, enforceable 
edge” that EU law provides to the Aarhus Con-
vention’s provisions, including through the clari-
fication of the sometimes equivocal lan-
guage used in it.8 It is worth noting that compli-
ance with the obligations foreseen by the Aarhus 
Convention is ensured by the Aarhus Conven-
tion Compliance Committee (ACCC), which is a 
quasi-judicial body that issues non-binding rec-
ommendations. However – especially once they 
are endorsed by the Meeting of Parties to the 
Convention – the ACCC recommendations are 
considered authoritative interpretations of the 
treaty provisions, which must be taken into ac-
count by domestic authorities and courts in the 
interpretation and implementation of the Con-
vention,9 as confirmed also by the UK Supreme 
Court.10  
The UK has been involved in the highest number 
of non-compliance cases considered by the 
ACCC,11 which has identified persistent prob-
lems with regard to the prohibitive expense of 
access to justice in environmental matters. The 
ACCC found different aspects of the costs re-
gime in England and Wales to be either “prohib-
itively expensive”12 or “unfair and inequitable,”13 
                                                        
8 M. Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Deci-
sion-Making (2014), p. 160. 
9 Decision I/7 Annex XII-37 (UN Doc ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8). 
10 Walton v. Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 per Lord 
Carnwath, para. 100: “Although the Convention is not part 
of domestic law as such (except where incorporated 
through European directives), …the decisions of the Com-
mittee deserve respect on issues relating to standards of 
public participation.” 
11 17 admissible communications have thus far been con-
sidered by the ACCC concerning the UK, while the party 
with the second highest number of cases has 5: 
http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=35289. 
12 ACCC/C/2008/27, paras 42-45; ACCC/C/2008/33, paras 
128-136; ACCC/C/2008/77, paras 72-77 of the Commit-
tee’s draft findings; ACCC/C/2013/85 and 
ACCC/C/2013/86, paras 113-122 of the Committee’s draft 
findings. 
13 Ibid; ACCC/C/2008/23, paras 48-52. 
noting that “in determining the allocation of costs 
in a given case, the public interest nature of the 
environmental claims under consideration [was] 
not in and of itself given sufficient considera-
tion.”14 The role of the EU judiciary in this con-
nection has thus been very significant. It has, 
first, clarified the obligations of the Convention. 
Upon a preliminary reference from the UK Su-
preme Court, the Court of Justice of the EU clar-
ified how to evaluate the prohibitive effect of liti-
gation costs, by stating that “the cost of proceed-
ings must neither exceed the financial resources 
of the person concerned nor appear, in any 
event, to be objectively unreasonable.”15 In mak-
ing such an assessment, national courts must 
take into account a number of factors, including 
the importance of what is at stake for the claim-
ant and for the protection of the environment, the 
complexity of the relevant law and procedure, 
and the existence of a national legal aid scheme 
or a costs protection regime. Second, the Euro-
pean Commission brought infringement pro-
ceedings against the UK,16 which together with 
the ACCC recommendations and two seminal 
reports prepared by members of the senior judi-
ciary (the Sullivan17 and Jackson18 reports) led 
to a broad-ranging reform of the England and 
Wales costs regime in 2013. The resulting ‘Jack-
son reforms’, however, have still been criticised 
for failing to fully address the issue of costs in 
cases relating to the Aarhus Convention. 19 
The procedural rules governing judicial review in 
England and Wales are different from those in 
Scotland, therefore the ruling of the Court of Jus-
tice of the EU (CJEU) did not extend to Scotland, 
14 ACCC/C/2008/33, para 129. 
15 Case C-260/11 – Edwards and Pallikaropoulos, para 40. 
16 Case C-530/11 – Commission v United Kingdom. It 
should, however, be mentioned that the case was decided 
after the introduction of the Jackson reforms. 
17 Ensuring access to environmental justice in England and 
Wales, Report of the Working Group on Access to Environ-
mental Justice (May 2008). 
18 Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: 
Preliminary Report (May 2009). 
19 UK fails Aarhus compliance test (New Law Journal, 17 
February 2014). Available online at: http://bit.ly/2dAmjcX; 
DEFRA, Decision V/9n concerning compliance by the 
United Kingdom with its obligations under the Aarhus Con-
vention, Second Progress Report (13 November 2015), pa-
ras 3-12. 
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yet similarities are evident.20 The Courts Reform 
Scotland Act 2014, following the Lord Gill’s Scot-
tish Civil Courts Review,21 addresses some is-
sues in the Scottish court system, which are sim-
ilar to those in the other British nations. The re-
form establishes a permission stage;22 a statu-
tory confirmation of the ‘sufficient interest test’ 
for standing developed under common law,23 
which allows for actions to be raised in the public 
(rather than individual) interest. Furthermore, it 
seeks to enhance legal certainty by setting a 
clear three-month time limits for supervisory ju-
risdiction, albeit a longer period may apply “as 
the Court considers equitable having regard to 
all the circumstances”.24 Additionally, rules on 
Protective Expense Orders (PEOs) in environ-
mental matters entered into force in March 
2013,25 with specific references to the Aarhus 
Convention included in January 2016.26 Yet, 
there is still scope for improvement. NGOs have 
raised concerns regarding the fact that “Scottish 
courts have not been quick to apply [the new 
standing test],” and that the time limit may be too 
stringent.27 In addition, legal aid remains largely 
unavailable for most environmental cases. Fur-
thermore, the general rule that the losing party 
in court proceedings must bear the costs of the 
successful party also applies to public interest lit-
igation and amendments for broader and more 
                                                        
20 In 2014, the Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Con-
vention adopted Decision V/9n on compliance by the UK, 
which referred to two non-compliance cases relating to 
Scotland: ACCC/C/2010/53 and ACCC/C/2012/68. Accord-
ingly, the progress reports that are submitted to the ACCC 
by DEFRA include updates on any amendments made to 
the Scottish regime with a view to ensuring compliance with 
the Convention. See also Steve Peers, ‘Europe to the Res-
cue? EU Law, the ECHR and Legal Aid’ in Palmer et al, 
Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics of Aus-
terity (2016). 
21 Scottish Civil Courts Review (Crown Copyright 2009) 
<http://tinyurl.com/hv43d6h>. 
22 Article 27B Court of Session Act 1988 (following section 
89 of the Courts Reform Scotland Act 2014). 
23 E.g. AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] 
UKSC 46.  
24 Article 27A Court of Session Act 1988 (following section 
89 of the Courts Reform Scotland Act 2014).  
25 Act of Sederunt (Rules of the Court of Session (Amend-
ment) (Protective Expenses Orders in Environmental Ap-
peals and Judicial Reviews) 2013, SSI 2013/81. About 
which T Mullen, ‘Protective Expenses Orders and public in-
terest litigation’ (2015) 19(1) Edinburgh Law Review 36.  
26 Rules of the Court of Session 1994 Amendment (No. 4) 
(Protective Expenses Orders) 2015, with specific reference 
to Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention. M Wright, ‘Access to 
inclusive rules on PEOs are still considered nec-
essary.28 Overall, these procedural hurdles still 
create some uncertainty and unaffordability that 
hinders recourse for many individuals, NGOs 
and communities, although Scotland has made 
steps forward.29 
In conclusion, the main risks arising from 
Brexit for Scotland are:  
Ø The potential lowering of standards in 
the domestic implementation of the 
Aarhus Convention if changes are 
made to existing legislation imple-
menting EU law on procedural envi-
ronmental rights, particularly with re-
gard to access to environmental infor-
mation and (to a certain extent) public 
participation in environmental deci-
sion-making and access to justice; 
and 
Ø the loss of the EU’s “hard enforce-
ment” infrastructure to ensure com-
pliance with relevant EU law, as well 
as the obligations under the Aarhus 
Convention. 
Justice in Scotland and the Aarhus Convention. Is Scotland 
fulfilling its obligation to provide access to justice in envi-
ronmental matters under Article 9 of the Aarhus Conven-
tion?’ (University of Edinburgh Dissertation 2016).  
27 Evidence to the Scottish Parliament Justice Committee 
on the Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill’ (Friends of the Earth, 
13 March 2014). 
28 G. Parihar, UK Compliance with Decision V/9n of the 
Meeting of the Parties, Statement made to the Aarhus Con-
vention Compliance Committee on behalf of the ‘Royal So-
ciety for the Protection of Birds’ and ‘Friends of the Earth’ 
groups in England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scot-
land (9 March 2016). 
29 B. Christman, Scotland needs a wider debate over envi-
ronmental justice (Holyrood, 14 September 2016). Availa-
ble online at: http://bit.ly/2cIGdlv. See also B. Christman 
(2014) The Poor Have No Lawyers: Scotland’s Non-Com-
pliance with the Access to Environmental Justice ‘Pillar’ of 
the Aarhus Convention, King's Inns Student Law Review 4, 
pp. 105-132; G. Parihar, UK Compliance with Decision 
V/9n of the Meeting of the Parties, Statement made to the 
Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee on behalf of the 
‘Royal Society for the Protection of Birds’ and ‘Friends of 
the Earth’ groups in England and Wales, Northern Ireland 
and Scotland (9 March 2016). 
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2. Risks with regard to EU law 
vis-à-vis the European 
Convention on Human Rights  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has an 
environmental provision,30 which enshrines a 
principle for public authorities to integrate a high 
level of environmental protection into other (non-
environmental) policies. This principle, however, 
does not amount to an individually justiciable 
substantive right to environmental protection.31  
Nevertheless, other provisions in the EU Char-
ter32 must be read as incorporating the proce-
dural environmental rights that have been rec-
ognised under the ECHR33 by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), namely: 
• A right to effective and accessible proce-
dures to enable individuals to seek all rel-
evant and appropriate environmental in-
formation, and to participate in environ-
mental decision-making, when their right 
to life, or/and their right to respect for pri-
vate and family life, are threatened;34  
• A right to access to justice and an effec-
tive remedy in environmental matters.35 
There is therefore significant overlap in terms of 
procedural environmental rights among the EU 
Charter, the ECHR and the Aarhus Conven-
tion.36 In addition, the EU Charter must be read 
as incorporating obligations concerning certain 
substantive standards of environmental pro-
tection that have been recognised by the EC-
tHR in relation to the protection of: 
                                                        
30 EU Charter Art. 37. 
31 G.M. Duran and E. Morgera, ‘Commentary to Article 37 
– Environmental Protection’ in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Ken-
ner, A. Ward (eds), Commentary on the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights (2014) 983. 
32 EU Charter, Arts 2, 7, 11, 17, 42 and 47. 
33 EU Charter, Art. 52(3). 
34 ECHR Art. 10, 2 and 8: Council of Europe, Manual on 
Human Rights and the Environment – Principles derived 
from the Case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(2012, 2nd edition), pp. 76-85. 
35 ECHR Arts. 6(1) and 13: Council of Europe (n 34 above), 
pp. 94-109. 
36 A significant overlap in the membership of the Aarhus 
Convention and that of ECHR has deeply influenced the 
• the right to life, which has been inter-
preted as placing a positive obligation on 
States to protect individuals’ life from 
dangerous activities, such as nuclear 
tests, the operation of chemical factories 
with toxic emissions or waste-collection 
sites, whether carried out by public au-
thorities or by private companies;37 
• the right to respect for private and family 
life, which has been interpreted as giving 
rise to a positive duty for States, under 
certain circumstances, to protect individ-
uals from environmental factors that di-
rectly and seriously affect their private 
and family life, or their home;38 and 
• the right to property, which has been in-
terpreted as imposing a positive obliga-
tion on States to put in place environ-
mental standards necessary to protect 
individuals’ peaceful enjoyment of their 
possessions.39 
These rights are already the object of interna-
tional obligations binding upon the UK as a party 
to the ECHR, and in the case of procedural en-
vironmental rights, also under the Aarhus Con-
vention. But their recognition under the EU Char-
ter, which has now the same legal strength as 
the highest instruments of EU law40 and takes 
precedence over all other sources of domestic 
law, results in a stronger remedy against incom-
patible acts of UK public authorities within the 
domestic legal system: if a case can be brought 
under the EU Charter, rather than the Human 
Rights Act - which incorporates most ECHR 
rights41 - the offending law can (effectively) be 
ECtHR’s interpretation of key provisions in the ECHR in or-
der to provide consistency and mutual supportiveness with 
the Aarhus Convention, even for those parties that have not 
ratified the latter. 
37 ECHR Art. 2: Council of Europe (n 34 above), pp. 35-41. 
38 ECHR Art. 8: Council of Europe (n 34 above), pp. 44-60. 
39 Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, Art. 1: Council of Europe (n 
34 above), pp. 62-73. 
40 TEU Art. 6(1). 
41 But not all: for instance, ECHR Art. 13, mentioned above 
as one of the ECHR rights used to recognise access to jus-
tice in environmental matters, is not. 
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struck down (rather than merely declared incom-
patible).42 This implication does not have exten-
sive relevance for Scotland, in that the Scottish 
Parliament and the Scottish Government are ab-
solutely prohibited from acting in breach of the 
ECHR under the Scotland Act 1998,43 so their 
incompatible acts would be declared invalid 
without the need to bring a case under the EU 
Charter. Nonetheless, the implication for the UK 
are relevant for Scotland to the extent that reli-
ance on the EU Charter can serve to declare in-
valid acts that are incompatible with relevant 
ECHR rights in environmental matters that are 
reserved (several powers related to energy, for 
instance) or are still governed by UK legislation 
(that is, issues may be devolved, but the Scottish 
Parliament has not yet legislated on them). 
Overall, the main risks arising from Brexit for 
Scotland are:  
Ø the loss within the domestic legal sys-
tem of a stronger remedy (disapplica-
tion) against acts violating EU Char-
ter/ECHR rights in environmental mat-
ters that are reserved or are still gov-
erned by UK legislation; 
Ø the loss of the EU’s “hard enforce-
ment” infrastructure to ensure com-
pliance with the EU Charter/ECHR en-
vironment-related rights. While, post-
Brexit, the European Court of Human 
Rights would still provide a harder en-
forcement system than the Aarhus 
Convention for procedural environ-
mental rights, the ECtHR entails addi-
tional complexities (exhaustion of do-
mestic judicial remedies, standing of 
NGOs, etc.).44 
It should be noted, in concluding, that EU law 
has not contributed significantly to implementing 
international obligations related to substantive 
                                                        
42 Benkharbouche & Anor v Embassy of the Republic of Su-
dan [2015] EWCA Civ 33, 5th February 2015. Note Protocol 
on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU to Poland and the UK, Article 1(2). 
43 Section 29(2)(d). 
44 Note that the ACCC procedure may also be triggered by 
the public, i.e. any ‘natural or legal persons, and, in accord-
ance with national legislation or practice, their associations, 
organisations or groups.’ 
standards of environmental protection as a mat-
ter of  human rights, and that the role of EU en-
forcement in connection with the substantive di-
mensions of the EU Charter/ECHR rights is 
speculative at present, if not to be excluded for 
the UK.45 Note in this connection also the UK 
Declaration to the Aarhus Convention: 
The United Kingdom understands the 
references in article 1 … to the 'right' of every 
person 'to live in an environment adequate to 
his or her health and well-being' to express an 
aspiration which motivated the negotiation of 
this Convention and which is shared fully by 
the United Kingdom. The legal rights which 
each Party undertakes to guarantee under 
article 1 are limited to the rights of access to 
information, public participation in decision-
making and access to justice in environmental 
matters in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention.46   
3. Benefits of environmental 
procedural rights 
Procedural environmental rights provide several 
benefits to the public. They serve to: 
1. raise awareness of the state of the environ-
ment and possibly motivate behavioural 
change; 
2. facilitate gathering of information for sounder 
environmental decision-making, which in 
turn likely increases legitimacy of, and buy-
in into, resulting decisions; 
3. facilitate accountability of government and 
others (including private entities, to some ex-
tent) as regards environmental protection 
throughout the policy process, with in-
creased scrutiny likely to lead decision-mak-
ers to give greater weight to environmental 
45 Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamen-
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considerations and adhere more closely to 
environmental policy and law); and 
4. enable improved implementation and en-
forcement of environmental law (in a climate 
of limited State resources and given the 
widespread nature of environmental harm), 
by empowering the public to control public 
authorities’ environmental decisions and 
protect their rights dependent on a healthy 
environment which may be/have been af-
fected by the proposed decision.47 
Accordingly, procedural environmental rights are 
key to empower the public and environmental 
NGOs to hold the State accountable for inad-
equate levels of environmental protection, 
and to enforce compliance with existing en-
vironmental standards. Such “private enforce-
ment” of environmental law will become even 
more important post-Brexit, due to the loss of the 
EU’s strong enforcement powers, which have 
been a significant factor in the raising of environ-
mental standards in the UK. But, equally, Brexit 
will put to an end the use of EU enforcement 
powers to ensure compliance with the UK’s in-
ternational obligations regarding procedural en-



































                                                        
47 C. Kimber, ‘Understanding Access to Environmental In-
formation: The European Experience,’ in T. Jewell and J. 
Steele (eds), Law in Environmental Decision-Making: Na-
tional, European and International Perspectives (1998) 
139, pp 142-143. 
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